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 French and Indian War:  
Culture Clashes during Wartime 
 
Peter Way, University of Windsor 
 
 
Traditional military history has primarily concerned itself with specific wars and battles, 
officers and command structure, logistics and strategy. War and Society studies have 
expanded the focus to the social and economic dimensions, and given more attention to 
the common soldier. Cultural studies, for the most part, have only begun to make inroads 
in the field of military history. Yet warfare, a seminal human experience touching all 
aspects of life, impacts culturally as much as militarily, politically or economically. 
Military conflict is much more than the melding of muscle and metallurgy in a sublime 
pursuit of armed superiority. Battle is a crucible of social identity. In the diverse peoples 
it brings together in coalition or opposition, the ideological justifications it constructs, 
and the devastation it wrecks, warfare has transformational powers. Established 
normative views guide the movement to war, and shape the social construction of the 
army, whilst cultural interaction occurring as a result of military action gives rise to new 
or altered understandings of other groups.  I have titled this lecture The French and Indian 
War, the name for the conflict more commonly used in America, because it points to the 
cultural content of the war, the ways in which identities inform human armed conflict. 
The North American military struggles of the French and Indian War should be 
projected onto an Atlantic World of the eighteenth century that was being redrawn in 
terms of economic systems, labor forms, and constituent peoples. The military, and 
inevitably its foot soldiers, assisted in the forging of commercial empire, the international 
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migrations of labor, the expropriation or enslavement of indigenous peoples, and the 
securing of the imperial state. All these processes were inscribed culturally and are fit 
subjects for fresh reading. What role then, did class, gender, ethnicity and racial models 
play in the waging of this war? 
 
Class 
For all the attention focused on common soldiers’ experience of warfare, the new 
military history has done little on the subject of soldiers as workers. Yet, Andre Corvisier 
reminds us that an etymological root of the word soldier (like soudoyer, soudard, and 
soldato) is one who is paid a wage (or solde) to fight.  Too often warfare is seen as an 
autonomous process serving higher purposes.  Doubtless, the nature of military conflict is 
in many ways unique:  in its goals, modes of organization, tactics, uses of technology, 
and legal apparatus.  Above all else, warfare’s seeming disregard for human life sets it 
apart.  But warfare should not be truncated from the same social and economic processes 
that transform broader society.  The army in the eighteenth century, as well as performing 
its primary military functions, was also central to Britain’s territorial and commercial 
expansion, to the conversion of masses of labor into wage workers, to the interaction of 
distinct cultural groups, and to the ethnic migrations of the early modern era.  While the 
new military history is focusing greater attention on these civil/martial interstices, one 
area that has yet to be examined closely is soldiers as workers.  
Yet, soldiers were a unique form of labor, ultimately for the same reason that the 
army was distinct:  their job required them to kill and be prepared to be killed.  Such an 
expectation could be found in no other form of work, no matter how oppressive, geared 
as it was to production.  Still, dying was a last resort, with fighting, winning and, ideally, 
living to fight another day being the reason they were hired.  Soldiers also performed 
many other mundane duties—digging, hauling, building, crafting goods—in common 
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with civilian workers.  Nevertheless, they were a peculiar type of paid worker subjected 
to a more restrictive labor contract and discipline, making them less than free. Soldiers’ 
status approximates that of indentured servants, in that they voluntarily yielded up control 
over their labor power in return for payment, but retained ownership of their persons. 
Thus, soldiers were a type of unfree labor, often bound for life, housed, provided for, and 
subjected to often brutal, martial discipline.  At the same time, in that soldiering was an 
exchange of labor for pay, the army must be seen as an employer, its officers as 
managers, and troops as workers, which opens the door to a labor history of the military. 
By the mid-eighteenth century, soldiers were drawn from early capitalist societies where 
paid labor was increasingly common.  Their class experience thus began before 
enlistment, but it is with mobilization that their formation as military labor begins.    
The Out-Pension Books for the Royal Chelsea Hospital recorded personal 
information for all those pensioners billeted outside the hospital, including their former 
occupations, which permits a reconstruction of their skills.1  Data (based on the records 
for all 845 soldiers granted pensions March 1757 through December 1760 whose 
regiments served in North America) reveals that the trades accounted for 49% of men, 
while manual labor made for 41.5%.  Those involved in agriculture comprised only 7.9% 
, but this likely undercounted them as many laborers would have been farm laborers and 
                                                 
1Admission Books, Out-Pension Records, Royal Hospital, Chelsea, Series 116, War Office Papers 
[WO116].  The Hospital was established in 1681 (completed 1692) as the army's institution for treating 
soldiers invalided through injury or 20 years of service.  See:  G. Hutt, Papers Illustrative of the Origin and 
Early History of the Royal Hospital at Chelsea.  Compiled in the Secretary’s Office at that Institution 
(London:  Eyre & Spottiswood, 1872), 53, 64-66, 255; C. G. T. Dean, The Royal Hospital Chelsea 
(London:  Hutchinson, 1950), 22, 70, 186. 
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some craftsmen would have been part-time farmers.  Four occupations preponderated:  
laborers (37.4%), textile workers (15%), shoemakers (7.2%), and tailors (4.9%). 
Enlisting meant joining the ranks of wage laborers.  For those that came from the land 
or the crafts, it was a true experience of losing the means of production; even for those 
entering from another form of paid labor, it usually meant induction to a more exacting 
form of work.  The British army in the Seven Years’ War was made up not primarily of 
professional soldiers, but by ordinary people drawn from their homes either through 
dwindling opportunity there or by the lure of the bounty money secured with enlistment.  
Army recruits brought with them skills and notions of customary obligations imbedded in 
economic exchange, as well as a tradition of plebeian resistance to perceived incursions 
on customary rights.  
Once on the job as soldiers they encountered a form of wage work that involved its 
own labor processes and social relations of production. A troop’s martial labor comprised 
training in the skills of soldiering, and applying those skills in defensive and aggressive 
situations such as digging entrenchments and fighting itself.  Warfare’s basic objective 
entailed killing one's opponent.  Wounds and death were also the wages of war for 
soldiers.  Alienation in this instance meant not only a metaphorical loss of selfhood, but 
for many actual physical loss or negation.   
Yet, combat was but one aspect of a soldier's working life.  More routine were the 
many "fatigues" required to keep a fighting machine functioning.  Troops cleared sites for 
camps, dug trenches and latrines, laid roads, cut wood for palisades, erected fortifications 
and barracks and cleaned grounds—the building materials of empire—receiving in return 
a wage of 8d. per diem, which had been set in 1660 and remained at this level until the 
late eighteenth century. Soldiers also performed civil labor—cutting wood, hunting for 
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food, harvesting crops, hauling provisions—warranting extraordinary payments.  The 
army also required many types of skilled work and men from the ranks with past 
experience as tailors, shoemakers and weavers all found work servicing the army.  The 
pay for both common and skilled labor varied for much of the War, but tended to be 6d. 
per day for common labor and 1s. for skilled work, more than matching their income as 
soldiers.   
The shared experience of military labor, not to mention the cohesion drummed into a 
fighting force, produced social integration, making for subaltern garrison communities, 
both separate from and intertwined with the military power structure. Separated from 
society into a demimonde of barracks, military camps and garrisons, living and fighting 
together, dressed in the same clothing and sharing the same food, troops developed their 
own active social life defined by commonplace transactions of shared toil and after-hours 
conviviality. 
Yet the army constituted a hierarchical power structure that wielded extensive 
authority over most aspects of its men’s lives.  Soldiers came from the common people, 
whereas those commanding hailed from middling people, the gentry and nobles.  As 
orders generally applied to living and working conditions, provision of food and shelter, 
and actual physical well-being, class conflict naturally fructified.  Military discipline also 
functioned as work discipline, and undisciplined behavior on the part of soldiers 
embodied resistance to that discipline.  While the military's emphasis on obedience 
reinforced the deference expected of laboring people, soldiering also bred a strong sense 
of fraternity, a camaraderie forged by the nature of their work and the unequal power 
relationships structuring it, which the issuing of orders and enforcement of discipline by 
superiors daily reiterated.  Thus, by grappling with their subordination, soldiers 
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approached a sense of shared identity, an incipient class consciousness. They 
accommodated themselves to their difficult life by following orders, but also by drinking, 
carousing, fighting, and thieving.  They resisted by shirking their duties, disobeying 
orders, petitioning against improper treatment, refusing to work, deserting, and 
mutinying.  Insubordination pervaded the eighteenth century army and collective action 
periodically threatened.  This class struggle reached its apogee in the wake of the war 
when the army’s attempt to redefine the terms of the military labor contract resulted in a 
general mutiny that spanned the British possessions in North America, making for 
pervasive subaltern resistance in the truest sense of the term. 
 
Gender 
Gender from the beginning of recorded history has dictated what a soldier is, with the 
very nature of warfare thus resting on assumed sexual differences. Warfare, as a central 
avenue to economic and political power, has been until very recently designated an 
exclusively male preserve. Military history subconsciously accepts this gendered logic; 
i.e., that violent contestation is natural, unavoidable, defining of national character, and 
laudable when performed by men. As a result, there has been little exploration of the 
ways in which notions of gender have impacted on warfare itself and molded camp life. 
Yet, the rhetoric of masculinity has always been marshaled to exhort men to martial 
endeavor and to decoy them into harm’s way. Conversely, notions of femininity have 
excluded women from warfare as other than victims and camp followers. This neglect is 
surprising given the fact that, despite the marked variability of both gender conventions 
and forms of warfare over time and between cultures, a universal gendering of war is 
apparent: almost without exception men have done the fighting in wars, while women 
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have been relegated to spectators, victims, or military support roles. The designation of 
warfare as a masculine pursuit is the constitutive aspect of war’s engendering, yet the 
ways in which this is achieved is particular to the historical period under consideration.  
Historians of gender in Britain have identified a great anxiety about the patriarchal 
order in the late sixteenth through eighteenth centuries, which manifested itself in 
prescriptive literature on household management and female conduct, and the policing of 
plebeian female transgressions by witchcraft persecutions, charivaris, and the use of 
ducking stools.2 In Britain during the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries, women were 
seen as sexual creatures with the potential to unman the male through their insatiable 
desire. This stereotype began to be replaced after 1660, with new notions of gender 
relations emphasizing sexual difference: men were associated with reason and culture, 
and women with nature and “sensibility,” a heightened nervous and emotional 
responsiveness.3  
Within the military both models of femininity can be seen at work; the misogynous 
variant viewed women as threatening to the male war effort, while the cult of sensibility 
cast women as by nature unsuited to warlike endeavor due to their emotionality and 
physical inferiority. Gender differentiation served fundamental military needs, mapping 
out “mutually informing binary oppositions such as war/peace, death/life, strong/weak, 
                                                 
2
 D. E. Underdown, “The Taming of the Scold: the Enforcement of Patriarchal Authority in Early 
Modern England,” in Anthony Fletcher and John Stevenson, eds., Order and Disorder in Early Modern 
England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 116-36; Hannah Barker and Elaine Chalus, eds., 
Gender in Eighteenth-Century England: Roles, Representations and Responsibilities (London: Longman, 
1997); Michael McKeon, “Historicizing Patriarchy: The Emergence of Gender Difference in England, 
1660-1760,” Eighteenth-Century Studies, 28:3 (1995): 295-322. 
3
 Anthony Fletcher, Gender, Sex and Subordination in England 1500-1800 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1995), 5-6, 283-84, 290-92, 296; G. J. Barker-Benfield, The Culture of Sensibility: Sex 
and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), xvii-xviii, 26-27, 
36; Robert B. Shoemaker, Gender in English Society, 1650-1850: The Emergence of Separate Spheres? 
(Harlow, Essex, UK: Longman, 1998), 8-9, 19-20.  
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military/civilian, defenders/defended, [and] friend/enemy,” with the masculine 
embodying the first half of the dyads (the warlike) and the feminine the second (the 
pacific). The military’s unique nature as an apparatus of state-sponsored killing leads to 
its separation from civilian society. This process of physical and normative severance is 
informed and validated by gender discourse, in this way naturalizing the violence 
essential to warfare.4 Militaristic misogyny was a necessary complement to martial 
endeavor. Conceiving of the feminine as corrupting of discipline and parasitical of 
resources, the army downplayed the existence of women, as their presence in this 
masculine world did not make sense within contemporary understandings of gender. 
Acting on this conception, officers sought to eliminate women by strictly limiting the 
number who could officially attach themselves to the regiments, by policing those 
women who on their own accord followed the camps, and by minimizing the economic 
opportunities available to them. 
More centrally, understandings of masculinity have reinforced the internal operation 
of the army in two ways. First, officers appeal to ideals of manliness to enlist men to the 
military, making soldiers the manliest of men. Conferring hyper-masculinity on soldiers 
achieves the military objective of preparing them to kill and be killed. Common soldiers 
were not irredeemably inferior in the way that women were; as men they had the 
potential for action (when properly officered), often heroic in nature. Military manliness 
was the psychological wage granted soldiers who in reality were largely denied most 
other things that defined a man in this period—a certain freedom of sexual expression, 
family life, economic activity, and spatial mobility. Devalued as immature males and 
dependent wage laborers, they occupied a demimonde outside civil society where 
                                                 
4
 Kovitz, “Roots of Military Masculinity,” 6. 
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military law reigned and the gender norms of mainstream society did not to apply. 
Second, hierarchical models of masculine authority inform military discipline, the 
male-on-male power structure so central to army life. In early modern England patriarchy 
was not the same thing as manhood, and in fact was designed to subordinate men as well 
as women. As such, patriarchy constituted “rule by fathers” rather than rule by men.5 In 
the colonies, patriarchal discourse was adapted to strengthen the powers of masters over 
servants and slaves.6 The army provides an appropriate institutional analogy to such 
subordination and can be seen as an exaggerated manifestation of patriarchy.7 The early 
modern army was a male-dominated sphere that valorized aggression in the cause of 
patriarchal dominance, the dynastic concerns of the King, the lineage issues of the 
aristocracy, and the socioeconomic interests of the officer class. Gender notions, in the 
relationships of father to son, and master to servant, provided a prescriptive language of 
natural subordination. The patriarchal army articulated the chain of command in terms of 
                                                 
5The literature on patriarchy is typically constructed in terms of male oppression of females, based on 
a binary opposition of male power and female oppression, Alexandra Shepard argues. Alexandra Shepard, 
The Meaning of Manhood in Early Modern England (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 1-5. 
Anne Lombard makes a similar argument for Puritan New England. Puritans did not think of gender as a 
dichotomy of male and female, but in hierarchical terms with distinctions drawn as much between adult or 
manly men and male youths, as they were with women. The authority of the father within the household 
was paramount in these “patriarchal families,” with both women and male youths situated below male 
heads of household in the hierarchy. The relationship between father and son constituted the foundational 
one among males in colonial New England, and it was bound up with issues of labor and property. In New 
England into the mid eighteenth century where land ownership was pervasive and the labor market stunted, 
the male head of household’s authority was accentuated as he had an even firmer grip on economic 
resources than did fathers in England, and male offspring had few alternatives. Age and economic 
independence, as well as tangled familial issues, acted as dividing lines between men with regard to the 
exercise of authority. Anne S. Lombard. Making Manhood: Growing Up Male in Colonial New England 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), 7, 10-11, chap. 1. 
6Carole Shammas, “Anglo-American Household Government in Comparative Perspective,” William 
and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, 52:1 (January 1995), 117-28; xv; Kathleen Brown, Good Wives, Nasty 
Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs: Gender, Race, and Power in Colonial Virginia (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1996), especially introduction.  
7Kathleen Brown defined patriarchy as: “the historically specific authority of the father over his 
household, rooted in his control over labor and property, his sexual access to his wife and dependent female 
laborers, his control over other men’s sexual access to the women of his household, and his right to punish 
family members and laborers.” Brown, Good Wives, 4-5.  
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this discourse both to reinforce discipline and to classify soldiers as other than civil 
beings. It treated soldiers both as perennially young males who had not achieved their 
majority to legitimate their subordination and to enjoin their labor. By these means, the 
military denied them certain rights and subjected them to a different legal code, seeking 
to render them dependent beings stripped of individual will, thus ideal soldiers better 
prepared to engage in deadly combat. 
The military thus does not merely reflect prevailing gender norms to no practical end; 
nor does it invests in gender distinctions primarily to privilege men over women. The 
army appropriates sex-based distinctions to facilitate the large-scale violence crucial to 
national interests. In the Seven Years’ War, Britain marshaled gender differentiation—
through the separation of masculine martial and feminine civil spheres, and the 
adaptation of patriarchal models of masculine authority to the chain of command—to the 
cause of vanquishing the French and establishing a grander territorial empire.  
Nor is it enough to document dominant gender ideology and its application by 
institutions of authority, for the nature of sexuality is inevitably contested. As within civil 
society, the modeling of sexual difference did not proceed without resistance in the 
military. Efforts to suppress the female presence in camps never came close to creating 
the ideal homosocial universe of masculine endeavor. Simply, women have always 
fulfilled a valuable function in the reproduction of warfare, serving in a variety of support 
roles, and contributing to a domestic sphere for soldiers.8 Likewise, soldiers inveterately 
contested the meaning of manhood constructed for them by their officer-patriarchs, 
                                                 
8
 Hacker, “Women and Military Institutions in Early Modern Europe,” 643-71. 
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positing alternative definitions.9 They purloined aspects of heroic masculinity—
toughness, courage, violence—from the interests of the state and appropriated them to 
their own soldier society, where physicality among fellow troops became defining 
features of proletarian manhood that implicitly challenged patriarchal order. 
Despite the prescriptive and oppressive qualities of military patriarchalism, soldiers 
and camp followers in the Seven Years’ War contested the gender roles established for 
them, bringing proletarian values of sexuality, domesticity and male autonomy to bear in 
ways that not only re-defined the gendered space of the martial sphere. Still, the military 
remained an unusual institution skewed toward aggression and violence, presumed 
masculine characteristics that were yoked to the interest of the state. When soldier 
sexuality conflicted with the masculine command structure it mobilized to re-establish 
patriarchal control within the camps. And however much control women exerted over the 
personal, it was outweighed by the public masculine power structure. The army exerted 
more punishing control than the state did in either Britain or the American colonies in the 
eighteenth century, and this discipline was applied to matters of gender relations. 
 
Ethnicity 
Ethnic, regional or national identities are historically and socially constructed, arising 
from cultural interaction with other groups. Warfare constitutes a key factor in such 
differentiation. First, military conflict typically pivots on ethnic frontiers, as material and 
political interests are defined in ethno-national terms. A state and its “people” need the 
“other” to wage war with psychological release from the taboo of murder. Regional, 
                                                 
9
 Shepard reminds us, it is wrong to assume that there was only one standard. Manhood does not 
equate to patriarchy, and could be asserted in ways that fell outside of and even conflicted with patriarchal 
norms. Shepard, Meaning of Manhood, 1-6. 
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cultural, linguistic, and religious particularities—the baggage of ethnicity—have always 
functioned as means of such differentiation. The French constituted England’s nemesis in 
the 18th century, their opposition rooted in a long term historical experience of frequent 
conflict that gave rise to congeries of perceived dissimilarities informing interaction 
between the two peoples. 
Second, in defining the other, however, one necessarily defines oneself. The patriotic 
idea of the Briton emerged as a concept meant to integrate a heterogeneous citizenry. 
Linda Colley maintained that the series of wars between Britain and France from 1689 to 
1815, and a shared experience of Protestantism most centrally constructed the sense of 
Britishness.10 The British defined themselves as a people in relation to an external Other 
not because of consensus and conformity within Great Britain, which did not blend its 
constituent peoples, nor, conversely, did an “English ‘core’” force its cultural and 
political authority on the Welsh and Scots. Colley asserted that all remained distinct 
peoples within the supra-entity.11 These qualifications aside, Colley does purport that the 
Briton constituted an overarching identity that knitted these constituent parts together. 
Colley’s model has been criticized for its exaggeration of the integrating powers of 
Protestantism, her timing of the real unification of national interests within Great Britain, 
and, most tellingly, its Anglocentrism.12  
Third, warfare functions as a determinative process in the construction of ethnic 
identities, which take shape and form alloys in the heat of battle. New synthetic identities 
                                                 
10
 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1737 (Orig. ed. Yale University Press, 1992; 
Paperback ed., London: Vintage, 1996), 3-4, 6, 9, 11-19, 56-57. 
11
 Ibid., 5-6. 
12
 See, for example, Murray G. H. Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain: Cultural Identities in 
Britain and Ireland, 1685-1789 (London: MacMillan, 1997); Colin Kidd, “North Britishness and the Nature 
of Eighteenth-Century British Patriotisms,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 39/no. 2 (June 1996), 361-82. 
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can be minted to integrate a fighting force and construct nouveau imperial identities. The 
Scottish Highlander embodied one such new identity wrought by war. Deemed warlike 
by nature and tainted with Jacobitism, their only use to the Empire being cannon fodder, 
the English allowed soldiers alone to embrace a regional Highland identity symbolized by 
the wearing of the plaid and the bearing of weapons. Likewise, an American identity was 
only beginning to crystallize at the time of Seven Years’ War, partly in opposition to the 
Briton. Both the identities of the Highlands and the American had their roots in the needs 
of the fiscal-military state as it waxed imperial. 
At once supra-national, national, regional, and even local, soldiers’ self-identification 
with and sense of belonging to a “place” presents itself more complexly than Colley and 
others would have it. Focusing singularly on the cultural thematic of the Briton obscures 
the messiness of identity formation in nascent imperial settings. Mobilizing the army to 
fight the Seven Years’ War entailed drawing people together from different countries or 
regions with varying social and religious norms into a polyglot, culturally heterogeneous 
whole. These people both adopted and contested the mantle of Britishness to suit their 
own needs. The War also marked a “turning point” in the sociocultural construction of 
the Empire, in that the vast territories acquired meant that Britain had to deal with the 
ethnic, religious and cultural particularities of vastly expanded territories.13  
However powerful as an abstract identity, the idea of Britons purported an internal 
integrity to the Empire that did not in fact exist. Hierarchies of ethnic types facilitate the 
assertion of dominance over dependent peoples so necessary in the imperial setting. 
England needed subordinate national identities, both to include in the imperial project 
undeniably distinct peoples wedded to the English state, but also to remind these 
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 Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 145. 
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colonized peoples that they remained apart from the English, who incorporated them into 
the Empire and remained their cultural as well as political superiors.  
From the global pretensions of the English at mid century and the concomitant 
expansion of the fiscal-military state beyond the British Isles, there developed new 
identity politics involving subject peoples and enemies alike. The army wielded ethnic 
identification as a dual-edged weapon within the larger struggle to create a territorial 
empire, both striking at the enemy and holding it over the heads of British subjects, old 
and new. The army, as the most palpable manifestation of central power within the 
Empire and arguably the most successful integrating institution in 18th century Britain, 
helped create and contain these multiple identities, allowing for differing forms of self-
identification and allegiance to the imperial project.14  
Soldiers felt both edges of the conflict, enforcing ethnic distinction through warfare 
and having their identities carved out for them by a greater England. More than this, they 
actively engaged in the formation of ethnic identities that did not always align with the 
models prescribed by the imperial state, and formed alliances across national boundaries 
that belied their essential difference and blurred the legitimating discourses of military 
conflict and imperial authority. 
 
Race 
Imperial expansion inevitably brought the British army into contact with aboriginal 
peoples. As war yield to victory in North America, protean racial concepts directly 
influenced British policy toward Native Americans, much to their detriment. Freed by the 
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 Steve Murdoch and A. Mackillop, eds., Fighting for Identity: Scottish Military Experience c. 1550-
1900 (Publishing?, date) xlii-xliii. 
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defeat of the French from the need to treat Indians relatively equitably as allies or 
potential allies, commanding officers allowed their latent contempt for these peoples to 
harden into a model of difference more fixed in its view of their natural subordinate 
status. Imperial policy sought to concrete this status, yet provoked violent backlash from 
many indigenous groups. 
In the past twenty years, the writing of “New Indian History” has effloresced. The 
literature, for the most part, argues for a dialectical exchange of native and European 
forces across what could be a permeable frontier, stressing mutual dependence, complex 
economic and social interaction, the achievement of a balance of power between Native 
Americans and Europeans in what Richard White terms “the middle ground.” 
Accommodation took place because whites for a long time could neither force Indians to 
do their will nor ignore them. But accommodation eventually broke down as whites 
gained the upper hand and proceeded again to define natives as “the other,” making it 
easier to dispossess them.15 New Indian histories are acutely tuned to the rhythms of 
native village and domestic life, but the desire to demonstrate Indians’ partial control 
over the course of imperial and national expansion, postponing decline to the post-
                                                 
15
 “The Middle Ground is the place in between: in between cultures, peoples, and in between empires 
and the nonstate world of villages,” according to Richard White. See The Middle Ground: Indians, 
Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), x. Dissolution of the middle ground begins in the Revolution for White, but does not fully unwind 
until the War of 1812. Other new Indian historians differ over the timing of the breakdown, but the 
Revolutionary period stands out as a watershed era. See also: James Merrell, Indians' New World: 
Catawbas and their Neighbors from European Contact through the Era of Removal (Norton); Daniel H. 
Usner, Jr., Indians, Settlers, and Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valley 
before 1783 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); Daniel K. Richter, The Ordeal of the 
Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1992); Gregory Dowd, A Spirited Resistance: North American Indian 
Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815 (Johns Hopkins); Michael McConnell, A Country Between: the Upper Ohio 
Valley and its Peoples, 1724-1774 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1992); Colin Calloway, The 
American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities 
(Cambridge); James Merrell, Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Colonial Pennsylvania Frontier 
(Norton). 
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revolutionary era, underestimates the extent to which eastern Indians had already been 
absorbed into or reduced to de facto clients of the Empire by mid-eighteenth century. 
And only within the last few years has the idea of race been revived as a salient concept 
for analyzing this loss of power by Indian east of the Mississippi.16 
The Seven Years’ War constituted an important event in this process, involving, as it 
did, a struggle over who would control eastern North America. Indians were intimately 
involved in the conflict, fighting for their own interests while being allied to one or the 
other of the European powers, or remaining neutral. Their war was not about empire-
building but was fought to, at the least, maintain the status quo ante, a delicate balance of 
British, French, Euro-American and Amerindian interests, from which the later derived 
significant benefit. Until the French were vanquished, Indians could not be ignored or 
pushed aside by either Europeans or their colonists. They were essential commercial and 
martial partners, who must be courted and given all due consideration.  
At root economic, political and personal, Native interaction with the military took 
place on a number of planes. With interests at root opposed to each other’s, it is no 
wonder that misunderstanding, miscommunication, and conflict frequently emerged 
between the British military and Indian tribes, friendly or otherwise. On an institutional 
level, the army, as the main broker of state policy, sought to maintain formal relations 
with the natives. This involved establishing political/military alliances and trade 
connections that were inevitably infused by cultural stereotyping. The military shifted 
from one stereotype of natives to another as need dictated, the "Indian" being made to 
play the savage, the cunning and potentially treacherous ally, the inscrutable neutral, and 
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the highly skilled woodsman, all with an eye to squeeze the most benefit possible out of 
these peoples. Similarly, Native Americans played on the paternalistic mind sets of 
Europeans to extract the trade goods and military support they desired, while enticing the 
British to partake of native forms of social practice, from lessons in wilderness living to 
symbolic exchange such as the smoking of the peace pipe and ritualistic torture and 
cannibalism.  
The defeat of the French and Spanish robbed Natives of alternative European allies, 
upsetting the diplomatic fulcrum upon which the middle ground acquired leverage, and 
allowing the British to impose upon them a less favorable client-patron relationship, one 
informed by racialist thinking. British leaders enjoined indigenous peoples, as dependents 
of the empire, not to disturb the peace, to engage in the production of staple commodities 
and participate in the commercial exchange on the same market terms as other people. 
General Jeffrey Amherst, Commander in Chief of British forces in North America, never 
at ease with the native combatants, attempted to restrict trade with Indians to army forts, 
to terminate the trade in firearms and ammunition, and to do away with the practice of 
gift giving, instead seeking to impose upon them a more commercial model of economic 
exchange. Amherst, allegedly, also intentionally infected the Delaware Indians with 
smallpox during Pontiac’s Rebellion.17 The emergence of racialist models for dealing 
with Indians in the last years of the war sought to fix natives in a subordinate position 
within the imperial ambit of power. 
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The military’s model of racial difference that came to be applied to Native Americans 
was contested on two fronts. First, soldiers encountered Indians as allies and enemies, 
and this led to both social intermingling and brutal bloodletting. In the process of 
carrying out the wishes of their leaders and in acting out their own drives, these people 
came into very close contact. There is no doubting the feeling of difference that each felt 
for the other, but nonetheless communication between soldiers and Indians took place—
conveyed through microbes, drink, sex, kinship, and hunting—and it is clear that each 
group learnt from the other. Due to the nature of their congress, this being a time of 
warfare, they exchanged military tactics and cultural practices associated with warfare, 
often cruelly violent, yet elemental human language ripe with promise of commonality 
and cooperation that threatened the command structure of the army and the class system 
that was embedded in British imperialism. The emergence of racialist models for dealing 
with Indians in the last years of the war in part acted to head off this convergence of the 
dispossessed by erecting figurative barriers between “whites” and “reds,” separating them 
as a means of ensuring stability on the imperial frontiers. 
Second, and more to the point, the British frontal assault on the fundamentals of both 
diplomatic and economic relations in the middle ground after the war provoked pervasive 
dissatisfaction from native peoples. Allies felt betrayed while former enemies resented 
the assumption that defeat of France somehow gave Britain the right to dictate terms to 
its former allies. In the spring of 1763, the so-called Pontiac’s rebellion erupted, 
signifying both the native people’s recognition of this transformation and their overt 
resistance to diminishing status, but as well an emergent world view that tentatively set 
Indian and white people as separate in nature, what could be perceived as proto-racialist 
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thinking.18 Tribal groups throughout the Ohio Valley attacked and in most cases captured 
British posts. The outcome of the Indian War had been all but decided by the end of 
1763, as natives suffered from a lack of firearms and ammunition, but fighting dragged 
on into 1765, an indication of their profound discontent for the new order of things.19  
Pontiac’s War can be conceived of as a colonialist struggle. Having lost their long term 
ally France as a result of the Treaty of Paris, these independent indigenous peoples were 
confronted by another European power, Britain, which claimed sovereignty over and 
stationed military garrisons in their lands, and imposed strict new trade relations upon 
them, all to be mediated through the army. Indians thus rose up against British claims of 
both territorial and commercial empire in the North American interior, claims informed 
by racialist thought, and the vassal status this meant to them. The changing definition of 
empire was no abstraction to these people, but a threatening new political economy 
manifested in military posts. Ripping these tendrils of empire out could not uproot British 
imperium, however, or unearth the insidious seeds of racial conflict. 
 
Conclusion 
The Seven Years’ War constituted at root an economic and political conflict. The military 
functioned as a central component of the merchant-capitalist state, with warfare a form of 
economic accumulation, which in this instance connected the merchants of Britain to the 
Euro-American producers of the North American colonies, as well as their servants and 
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slaves, and, beyond, to Native American peoples, with soldiers providing the key links in 
this marketplace of trade, theft, conflict, and social exchange within the Atlantic World. 
Inevitably, a social context existed to this armed conflict. The European powers, their 
colonial appendages and the various aboriginal groups operated within a transoceanic 
system cultural in nature as well as economic and political. Gendered, ethnic, and racial 
identities proved central to the formation of the Empire in its many phases: the 
mobilization of the male population; the exercise of command within the military; the 
conceptualization of the self and enemy other; the creation of subject identities in the 
imperial hierarchy; and the solidification of racial categories for various indigenous 
peoples subsumed or alienated by the Empire. As such, within the context of military 
history these categories of analysis must be synthesized with the “real” politics of state 
conflict. To treat the cultural and the military separately provides interesting and 
informative vignettes of the culture of warfare; to coalesce into a whole and integrate into 
an analysis of specific historical conflicts provides a powerful model explaining warfare 
in its many uniforms. Utilizing the fruits of culture war, the historian can pry open the 
broader interests contained within the history of the military, a core social organization, 
and warfare, a seminal human experience. 
 
 
 
